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NOTES
TAKING THE EARLY FLIGHT OUT TO PASTURE: THE SECOND
CIRCUIT ADDS A NEW WRINKLE TO VOLUNTARY EARLY
RETIREMENT PROGRAMS UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT
The decision to accept early retirement may be the single
most important decision in an employee's career. Federal age
discrimination law requires that this decision be made volunta-
rily by the employee free from coercive pressure exerted by the
employer. The Second Circuit, through its decision in Paolillo v.
Dresser Industries, held that adequate time to make this choice
is essential to its voluntariness, and its absence may negate a
signed acknowledgment attesting to the employee's freedom of
choice. Other circuits, particularly the Seventh Circuit, have ig-
nored the Paolillo decision's reasonable time requirement by fo-
cusing upon the signed acknowledgment, finding that its exis-
tence proves voluntariness as a matter of law, regardless of the
time allotted for acceptance. This division brings to light a sig-
nificant split in circuit authority going to the very meaning of
voluntariness under the age discrimination laws, and whether
the concept of reasonable time can ever be divorced from its
legal definition. The ultimate resolution of this question, as-
suming that the Supreme Court chooses to address it, will have
to strike a delicate balance between an employer's legitimate
objectives in structuring its early retirement plan with a short
time frame and the equally valid concern of allowing the em-
ployee enough time to arrive at a reasoned choice.
IN THE FIRST HALF of 1987, a significant split of authority
arose in the circuits when two conflicting court of appeals deci-
sions were handed down concerning voluntary early retirement
programs offered solely to employees above a given age.' The di-
1. Compare Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.)(holding that employees'
acceptance of early retirement offer, and signed acknowledgment that acceptance was
freely made, did not preclude subsequent age discrimination claim as a matter of law;
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vergence of opinion centered upon the issue of whether these plans
raise inferences of age discrimination under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act2 (ADEA) and whether retired employees
can later challenge the validity of a plan that they had previously
agreed to accept. An important issue addressed in both cases, and
forming the prime concern in one of them, was whether a claim
could arise over the adequacy of the time given to the employees
to make their decision.'
In Paolillo v. Dresser Industries,4 Chief Judge Wilfred Fein-
berg, writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, held that
an employee's decision to accept the offer of early retirement may
not be totally voluntary when that employee is given an inordi-
nately short time to make such an important decision. The facts
offered only to those employees aged 60 and over), replacing 813 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1987)
with Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.) (stating that an offer of
early retirement is beneficial to both employer and employee and is therefore not indicative
of age discrimination; applied to employees aged 55 and over), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 454
(1987).
The decision of the Paolillo court that first appeared at 813 F.2d 583 was withdrawn
upon the employer's petition for rehearing. The opinion found at 821 F.2d 81 was substi-
tuted therefor. 821 F.2d at 82 n.l.
2. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ I-
16, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1986 & Supp.
1988)).
3. The plans at issue were so-called "window plans" in which "the employee has a
limited time to opt in . . . with an improved pension benefit or cash payment as an incen-
tive and possibly extended health coverage." Gottuch, Early Retirement Plans and Worker
Choice, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1072, 1073 (1988).
The factual question of whether the employees were given adequate time to reach
their decision was directly at issue only in Paolillo, where sufficient time to make a deci-
sion was held to be necessary and relevant to the voluntariness of the acceptance. 821 F.2d
at 84. The time factor was specifically addressed in Henn as well, although it was not the
sole focus of the opinion, where the court reached a contrary conclusion to that expressed
in Paolillo: "[N]either the brevity of the time nor the difficulty of the choice makes the
decision 'involuntary.'" 819 F.2d at 828.
4. 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.), replacing 813 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1987).
5. Id. at 83. A look at comparable "window periods" for acceptance helps to put into
perspective the short time given to the retired employees in Paolillo.
A 1985 survey of 100 companies performed by the management consulting firm of
Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby (TPF&C), found that 64 of the 100 respondents offered
early retirement plans to their employees.
[W]hile the actual window periods varied, more than 60 percent were found to
be in the range of one month to three months: 33 percent said they had a four-
to seven-week window period, and 27 percent said they had an eight- to I l-week
window period. Seven percent of the TPF&C respondents said their window pe-
riod was less than four weeks; 13 percent reported having a 12 to 15 week win-
dow; 5 percent reported a 16 to 19 week window; 6 percent reported [a] 20 to 27
week window; 6 percent reported 28 or more weeks; and 3 percent said the win-
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of Paolillo presented the court with an extreme example of a
short deadline. It was shown that two of the three employees
bringing the suit were given only three days to decide whether to
accept the offer; and the third, by her own account, less than one
day.' The court concluded that the structure of the plan may have
placed undue pressure on the employees to accept, and therefore,
found that it was error for the district court to hold that an age
discrimination claim was precluded as a matter of law7 The Sec-
ond Circuit ultimately held that:
[T]he shortness of time given to appellants to make a decision,
the reason for the compressed time period, the length of service
of appellants with [the employer] and the apparent complexity
of the options open to them certainly raise a material issue as to
whether appellants were given sufficient time to make a consid-
ered choice."
While the court did not directly address the merits of the em-
ployees' claim, it did conclude that the additional pressure may
have caused the employees to make a decision that was not truly
voluntary, 9 thus raising factual issues of elemental concern under
the ADEA. 1°
dow period varied.
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. OLDER AMERICANS IN THE WORKFORCE: CHALLENGES
AND SOLUTIONS 61, 65 (1987) [hereinafter CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS].
6. 821 F.2d at 84-85.
7. Id. at 84.
8. Id. The employer in Paolillo had originally allocated 14 days for employees to
decide, but the time was reduced due to administrative problems encountered by the em-
ployer in implementing the plan. Id. The employer's desire to have final decisions made
prior to the end of its fiscal year resulted in the shorter time frame actually offered to the
employees. Id.
The length of service with the employer for the named plaintiffs in Paolillo were as
follows: Lucy Wadsworth, 15 years (less than one day to make decision); Dominic Paolillo,
16 years (three days to decide); Robert Grady, 31 years (three days to decide). Id. at 82-
83.
9. Id. at 84.
10. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1986) which states:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age [.j
with 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1986)(emphasis added) which provides:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization-
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide
employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is
not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such em-
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Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Henn v. National Geographic Society directly
opposed Paolillo."l The court held in Henn that older employees
who have been given the opportunity to retire early are the benefi-
ciaries of any distinction based upon their age; therefore, they
cannot claim to be adversely affected by the design of the offer,
since they are members of a favored group under such plans. 2
The Henn court, commenting upon the possibility that lack of
time may equal lack of choice, took specific issue with the Paolillo
court's "unusual definition of 'involuntary.' "13
These two conflicting rulings bring to light a significant divi-
sion of opinion within the federal circuits which the Supreme
Court may ultimately be called upon to resolve.' 4
The few courts that have addressed the topic of age discrimi-
ployee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such
seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involun-
tary retirement of any individual. . . because of the age of such individual [.]
11. 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 454 (1987).
12. Id. at 827. The Henn decision was rendered in direct response to the first (now
withdrawn) Paolillo opinion, reported at 813 F.2d 583, which held that the former employ-
ees had established their prima facie case of age discrimination by "showing that they were
between 40 and 70 years old, and that their employment . . . ended pursuant to an early
retirement plan." Id. at 585. The substituted opinion filed by the Second Circuit, found at
821 F.2d 81, did not specifically reiterate these words, yet the court continued in its belief
that the early retirement plan at issue was not voluntary as a matter of law due to the
possibility that coercive pressure may have been placed upon the employees to accept the
plan. Thus, the decision essentially reaffirmed the original holding that it was error to
award summary judgment in the case. 821 F.2d at 84-85.
13. 819 F.2d at 828-29.
14. See Sup. CT'. R. 17 which states in part:
A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor.
The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discre-
tion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered.
(a) When a federal court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with
the decision of another federal court of appeals on the same matter . . . as to
call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.
Sup. CT. R. 17.1(a).
While it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever decide upon this issue in regard
to the Henn case, since certiorari has already been denied, it is still conceivable that the
Court will have to address the issue of whether a lack of time to make a decision can so
compromise the voluntariness of the decision as to violate the ADEA. This facet of the
division between the two circuits remains unresolved. As a result, the conflict remains "pre-
served" for a future appeal to the Supreme Court since it was not an issue raised in the
petition for certiorari in Henn. 56 U.S.L.W. 3344 (1987)(outlining the issues presented in
the petition for certiorari); see also Sup. CT. R. 51.2 (which states by negative implication
that a denial of certiorari upon an issue is limited to the specific issues addressed in the
petition).
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nation in early voluntary retirement plans since the Paolillo and
Henn decisions uniformly support the Henn decision, while
Paolillo has been relegated to the position of a disfavored "cf" or
"but see" case.15
It is disturbing that Paolillo has been viewed as an anoma-
lous decision by other courts. The Second Circuit was merely
pointing out that there may be situations where implementation of
an early retirement plan is so poorly designed that a signed ac-
ceptance of the offer may not be conclusive evidence that the deci-
sion was voluntary.' 6 Paolillo should not be read as a broad-
brushed condemnation of early retirement plans. It is only a rec-
ognition that some plans may fail to allow the employee to make a
reasoned choice. When this occurs, it can result in a valid claim of
age discrimination raising material issues of fact worthy of getting
past the hurdle of summary judgment when brought before a
court.
A tempting "carrot" of an offer to retire early has previously
been accused of being attached to the painful "stick" of age dis-
crimination when the offer is tendered for the purpose of thinning
out the older employees from the company's ranks.'7 Sometimes
this offer is accompanied by subtle intimations that the older em-
ployees may be dismissed for "economic reasons" if they do not
accept, in which case the choice can be compared to one of "vol-
unteer or else."' 8
The former employees in Paolillo may not have retired pur-
suant to such an ill-meaning plan. Nevertheless, the Second Cir-
cuit seems justified in holding that a reasonable amount of time is
necessary to make the important decision of whether to accept
early retirement. The Paolillo opinion acknowleges that the
amount of time could vary in relation to the complexity of the
decision to be made and the financial considerations to be taken
into account, yet it makes sure to acknowledge that a question of
"reasonable time" does exist.'9
Some employers may fear that the Second Circuit decision
15. See, e.g., Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987); Schuler v.
Polaroid Corp., 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1415, 1416 (D. Mass. 1987), aff'd, 848
F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1988).
16. 821 F.2d at 84.
17. See Kass, Early Retirement Incentives and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 4 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 63, 80-82 (1986).
18. Id. at 80-81.
19. 821 F.2d at 84.
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presents an opportunity for unwarranted judicial intrusion upon
their right to structure their business affairs as they see fit.2" They
may also fear that the decision will open the door to a rash of
groundless age discrimination claims brought by dissatisfied for-
mer employees who now regret their decision to retire early. The
actual holding of Paolillo, however, does not support such fears.
The decision merely puts the employer on notice that if it chooses
to offer early retirement to its employees, it must do so in a way
that gives the employee an opportunity to make a reasoned choice.
This is, in fact, just a logical extension of the voluntariness re-
quirement that has been a part of the ADEA throughout most of
its existence.21 Nothing in the opinion indicates that Paolillo will
20. This is a legitimate concern. The ADEA is not intended to usurp the function of
business managers in structuring the employer-employee relationship. See Kephart v. Insti-
tute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, however, was not intended as a vehicle for judicial review of business
decisions .... The question is whether he was discriminated against because of his age.
• .. [B]eyond that the court will not inquire into the defendant's method of conducting its
business."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
21. The general prohibition of involuntary retirement on account of age with respect
to seniority systems or employee benefit plans was added to the ADEA as part of the 1978
Amendments. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (1978) [hereinafter ADEA Amendments of 1978].
A significant exception, albeit a temporary one, to the voluntariness requirement con-
cerns tenured faculty at institutions of higher education:
(a) SPECIAL RULE.-Section 12 of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 631) is amended by adding at the end thereof the fol-
lowing new subsection:
"(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retire-
ment of any employee who has attained 70 years of age, and who is serving
under a contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement providing for un-
limited tenure) at an institution of higher education (as defined by section
1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965)."
(b) TERMINATION PROVISION.-The amendment made by subsection (a) of
this section is repealed December 31, 1993.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 6,
100 Stat. 3342, 3344 (1986)(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(d) (Supp. 1988))
[hereinafter ADEA Amendments of 1986].
Another notable exception to the prohibition of involuntary retirement concerns bona
fide executives or high policymakers:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retire-
ment of any employee who has attained 65 years of age and who, for the 2-year
period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executive or
high policymaking position, if such employee is entitled to an immediate nonfor-
feitable annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or de-
ferred compensation plan, or any combination of such plans, of the employer of
such employee, which equals, in the aggregate, at least $44,000.
29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1) (Supp. 1988).
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take away employers' ability to offer early retirement to their em-
ployees, or create rights that did not previously exist.22 The Sec-
ond Circuit recognized in Paolillo that if adequate time and op-
portunity to make a reasoned choice are denied, its
"voluntariness" may be largely illusory. Thus the lack of time to
make a reasoned choice may result in a violation of the employee's
rights under the ADEA. However, Paolillo currently stands alone.
For a better perspective on the issues presented by the
Paolillo and Henn decisions, an examination of the ADEA's his-
tory and statutory purpose is provided below. The two conflicting
circuit court opinions will then be discussed in greater detail in
Section II.
I. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
A. An Introduction to the Meaning of Age Discrimination
Age discrimination, or "ageism," 2 3 is the term used to de-
scribe the practice of treating two persons or groups of people dif-
ferently solely on the basis of their ages, especially when there is
no reasonable basis for making the age distinctions. 4 Some obvi-
ous examples are help-wanted advertisements seeking to find ap-
plicants who are "age 25 to 35," "young," or even "over age
50."'2 More subtle examples occur when advertisements are di-
rected toward "recent college graduates" or toward certain age
groups with the phrase "supplement your pension."2 Such distinc-
tions often are influenced by popular assumptions about the effect
22. The Paolillo court stated in its first opinion that it was only pointing out the
existence of rights that were implicit in the statute: "we have not found any cases discuss-
ing how the shortness of time allowed for a decision may affect the voluntariness of the
decision. Nevertheless, implicit in the exception under section 623(0)(2) is the employer's
duty to give employees sufficient time to make a decision." Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 813
F.2d 583, 586 (2d Cir.), withdrawn, 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1987).
23. The term "ageism" was coined by Dr. Robert N. Butler to describe the prejudice
that many people have toward older individuals in society. R.N. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE?:
BEING OLD IN AMERICA 11-12 (1975).
24. Note, The Scourge of Age Discrimination in the Workplace: Fighting Back with
a Liberalized Class Action Vehicle and Notice Provision, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103,
132 (1986).
25. See C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, FEDERAL AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW: SLOWING DOWN THE GOLD WATCH 91-97 (1978); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 394 (1976).
26. EDELMAN & SIEGLER, supra note 25, at 91-97; SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note
25, at 394.
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that age has on ability.2 7 These assumptions operate to the detri-
ment of older people.
[Ilt is a sad day indeed when a man realizes that the world has
begun to pass him by; that happens to all of us sooner or later.
But it is surely a much greater tragedy for a man to be told,
arbitrarily, that the world has passed him by, merely because
he was born in a certain year or earlier, when he still has the
mental and physical capacity to participate in it as energeti-
cally and vigorously as anyone else.28
Of course, not all distinctions based upon age are unjustified.
Few would argue that it is irrational to set minimum ages for cer-
tain activities such as entering school, voting, drinking, or driving.
Some notable examples of accepted "age discrimination" are
found in the United States Constitution, which includes a number
of distinctions based upon age.29 However, when age is used to
close off employment opportunities for older people, or to preclude
someone from being allowed to remain in a position that he or she
should be entitled to keep, then a remedy through legislative and
judicial protection is warranted. 0
27. An article describing the misconceptions that many employers have toward older
employees outlines some of the most common reasons for not hiring or promoting them as:
1. Older workers are often afflicted with physical and mental affirmities.
2. Young people must be hired who can be trained, motivated and promoted.
3. Young people are willing to work for less money than older people.
4. Pension, health and life insurance costs increase as the worker ages.
5. Many older workers lack skill, experience or education.
6. According to mortality tables, the older worker will work less time for the
firm than a younger worker.
7. Older workers are more costly to train and are less productive.
8. Older workers are less adaptable and more difficult to train than younger
workers.
9. Balance in age is needed in every work force. Because seniority clauses in
collective bargaining agreements determine retention and promotion, employers
need to hire young persons whenever possible.
10. Young executives feel uncomfortable directing older employees.
Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age Discrimination
Laws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REv. 839, 845 (1974).
28. 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967)(statement of Sen. Javits).
29. U.S. Representatives must be at least 25 years of age. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl.
2. U.S. Senators must be at least 30 years of age. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. The
President and Vice-President must each be at least 35 years of age. U.S. CONsT. art. II, §
1, cl. 5 and U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office
of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States."). See also
Note, supra note 24, at 132-33 & n.170 (indicating that "use of age as a proxy is prevalent
in the United States Constitution itself").
30. The need for legislative protection against age discrimination was recognized by
the states long before Congress took action on the subject. Notice of this was taken during
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B. A Look at the History, Legislative Purpose, and
Administration of the Act
Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York, perhaps one of the
most dedicated and outspoken advocates of the older American
worker, eloquently summed up the problem of age discrimination
in employment when he stated:
Age discrimination in employment is a tragedy, not only from
the standpoint of our older workers themselves, but also from
the standpoint of the nation as a whole. For it represents a
great waste of one of our more precious resources- in this case
the talent and experience accumulated by our older workers
over many years. We must also remember, too, that youth itself
has a stake in guarding against age discrimination in employ-
ment, for nothing but time stands between the "younger
worker" and the "older worker."3'
Among the provisions included in the Civil Rights Act of
196432 was a directive to the Secretary of Labor to prepare a
study of age discrimination in employment. 33 The resulting report,
entitled The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment,34 was issued in June of 1965 and presented two months
floor debates of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and was used as a
motivating factor for enacting Federal legislation. See 113 CONG. REc. 31,253
(1967)(statements of Sen. Yarborough and Sen. Javits); 113 CONG. REc. 34,741
(1967)(statement of Rep. Perkins); see also SEN. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3
(1967)(Report of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT];
H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967)(Report of Committee on Education and
Labor) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
31. Age Discrimination in Employment, 1967: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
The admonition of Senator Javits, highlighting the fact that the younger workers of
today are the older workers of tomorrow, becomes especially urgent in light of future polu-
lation trends. Persons aged 65 and above are expected to comprise 13.9 percent of the
American population in the year 2010 - 39.3 million people, and will account for more
than 20 percent of the population 20 years later - 64.3 million people. CHALLENGES AND
SOLUTIONS, supra note 5, at 15.
If these population trends are projected a few steps further, with a focus upon the
possible effect that widespread discriminatory employment practices could have on persons
over 55, the warning becomes even more compelling. By the year 2020 the entire "baby
boom" generation will be of age 55 or above - almost 76 million people would be affected.
Id. at 18.
32. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. No. 88-352, §§ 101-1106, 78 Stat. 241
(1964)(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1986), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a to
1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1986 & Supp. 1988)).
33. Id. § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265.
34. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER-AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
1988-891
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later to a subcommittee of the House Committee on Education
and Labor.3 5 In the report, the Secretary recommended that Con-
gress take action to eliminate arbitrary age discrimination found
in the workplace. The Secretary stated that:
The possibility of new nonstatutory means of dealing with such
arbitrary discrimination has been explored. That area is barren.
The elimination of arbitrary age limits in employment will pro-
ceed more rapidly if the Federal Government declares, clearly
and unequivocally, and implements so far as is practicable, a
national policy with respect to hiring on the basis of ability
rather than age.
3 6
The following year, the Secretary was directed by statute to
submit his findings and recommendations to Congress.37 These
findings, bolstered with evidence of executive concern over the
problem,38 resulted in the tandem message transmitted to Con-
gress by the Secretary in February of the same year.39
Hundreds of thousands not yet old . . . find themselves job-
less because of arbitrary age discrimination.
In economic terms, this is a serious, and senseless, loss to
the nation on the move. But the greater loss is the cruel sacrifice
in happiness and well-being which joblessness imposes on these
citizens and their families.""
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act4' (ADEA) was
EMPLOYMENT (1965).
35. House REPORT, supra note 30, at 1.
36. Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on H.R. 3651, H.R. 3768, and
H.R. 4221 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1967) (statement of William D. Bechill, Commissioner on Ag-
ing, quoting the Secretary's report) [hereinafter House Hearings]; Senate Hearings, supra
note 31, at 84 (Commissioner's prepared statement read into Senate record).
37. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 606, 80 Stat.
830, 845 (1966).
38. See President Lyndon B. Johnson's Special Message to the Congress Proposing
Programs for Older Americans, 1 1967 PuB. PAPERS OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON 32, 37
(1968)("[O]pportunity must be opened to the many Americans over 45 who are qualified
and willing to work. We must end arbitrary age limits on hiring.").
39. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 2 (showing President Johnson's recommenda-
tion of The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); HOUSE REPORT, supra note
30, at 2 (same); House Hearings, supra note 36, at 9 (prepared statement of Secretary of
Labor adverting to the President's message); Senate Hearings, supra note 31, at 37 (pre-
pared statement of Secretary read into Senate record).
40. House Hearings, supra note 36, at 9 (prepared statement of Hon. W. Willard
Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, quoting President Johnson's message to Congress); Senate
Hearings, supra note 31, at 37 (same, as read into the Senate record).
41. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ I-
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enacted by Congress in 1967 to protect older workers from em-
ployment discrimination based upon their age.42 From the outset,
congressional attention was most keenly focused upon the hiring
barriers and forced terminations of employment encountered by
many older workers.4 3 The ambitious goals that some of the legis-
lators sought to achieve were expressed in phrases such as: "[This
bill] in fact is more than a bill to bar age discrimination. It is a
bill to promote employment of middle aged and older
persons . . . ."" These same legislators were pragmatic as well
as enthusiastic. Realizing that they could not tackle the whole
problem of age discrimination in one bill, they instead chose to
first "strike at the heart" of the problem, limiting the bill's focus
to the areas where discrimination was felt to be most prevalent. 45
Among the many considerations addressed by Congress in
creating the ADEA was a concern for the rights of individuals,46
the effects that non-employment of older workers had on the econ-
omy, and the effects of ageism on all older people. 47 A major im-
petus of the hearings was a desire to dispel the widely held notion
that workers grow less competent as they grow older.48
The ADEA, as originally enacted, limited its protection to
employees between the ages of forty and sixty-five years.49 This
16, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1986 & Supp.
1988)).
42. Id. § 2(b), 81 Stat. 602, 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1986)).
43. See 113 CONG. REC. 2467 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough at introduction
of the bill before Congress which later became the Act).
44. 113 CONG. REC. 34,740 (1967)(statement of Rep. Perkins)(emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. See The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §
7(c), 81 Stat. 602, 604 (1967)(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1986) with the word
"chapter" in the place of "Act") which created a general private cause of action under the
Act:
Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent
jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of
this Act: Provided, That the right of any person to bring such action shall termi-
nate upon the commencement of an action by the Secretary to enforce the right
of such employee under this Act.
Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1986)(which specifically extends the private cause of
action to employees of the federal government).
47. Kass, supra note 17, at 68; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 7; HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 30, at 7-8.
48. See generally House Hearings, supra note 36 passim; Senate Hearings, supra
note 31 passim (almost every person who testified at either the House or Senate hearings
mentioned the desire to dispel such concepts of the older worker).
49. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12,
81 Stat. 602, 607 (1967)(amended 1978 and 1986)(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1986 &
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section has since been amended twice, so that coverage of the Act
now extends to all employees over forty years of age.50 The provi-
sions of the Act apply to persons employed by the federal govern-
ment, all state and local governments, and most private
employers. 1
Enforcement and administration of the ADEA currently falls
within the domain of the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission5 12 (EEOC). In recent years, the ADEA has been both a
prolific source of requests for administrative redress and of litiga-
tion.53 In fact, the EEOC reports that administrative complaints
of age discrimination now constitute the fastest growing category
of claims with which it deals. 4
Supp. 1988)).
50. Congress first expanded the general protection of the Act in 1978 to include
individuals aged 40 to 70 who were employed in the private sector, and eliminated a maxi-
mum protected age for federal government employees altogether. ADEA Amendments of
1978, supra note 21, §§ 3(a), 5(a), at 189-90, 191.
In 1986, Congress further amended the Act by eliminating the age limitation of 70
years so that it now prohibits age discrimination against all employees 40 years of age and
older. ADEA Amendments of 1986, supra note 21, § 2 (c), at 3342.
51. Specifically, the Act applies to employees of those "engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce [having] twenty or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year: Provided, That
prior to June 30, 1968, employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be considered
employers." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1986). Protection is also extended to those employed by
"State[s] or political subdivision[s] of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State
or a political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency. ... Id.; but see 29
U.S.C. § 630(f) (1986)(excepting elected officials of state and local governments and their
aides from coverage under the Act). Federal government employees are included through
29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (1986).
The 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act specifically extended the pro-
visions of the ADEA to the types of employers listed above, and empowered the United
States Civil Service Commission to enforce the Act with regard to federal employees. Pub.
L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74-75 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1967) and creating 29
U.S.C. § 633a (1974) (amended 1978)).
52. Originally, the ADEA placed administrative and enforcement authority in the
Department of Labor. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-202, § 6, 81 Stat. 602, 604 (1967). This authority was transferred to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from the Department of Labor pursuant to Reorg.
Plan No. I of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. app. at 131
(Supp. 1988), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
53. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative De-
fense: The Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Exception, 66 B.U.L. REv. 155, 155
(1986).
54. Id. at 155-56 (citing Vihstadt, Congressional Update, 5 BIFOCAL 8 (1984)).
More recent statistics confirm this finding. It was reported that:
In fiscal year 1986, nearly two and one-half times as many age bias charges
were filed with the EEOC and state fair employment practice agencies as were
filed in fiscal year 1980. A year-by-year breakdown [of these charges] is as fol-
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As a preliminary matter, it should be pointed out that while
the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 are
similar statutes,56 some important differences exist.57 Most obvi-
ously, the ADEA is exclusively concerned with age discrimination,
while Title VII is concerned with the prohibition of discrimination
due to race, sex, religion, and national origin.5 8 Another difference
is the availability of a jury trial in ADEA suits, but not in Title
VII suits.59 The most important difference, however, is who bears
the initial burden of persuasion and when, if ever, it shifts to the
other party. Courts have been much more reluctant to shift this
burden to defendants in ADEA suits, which would require them
to show nondiscrimination, than in Title VII cases.60
C. Focus upon Section 623(0(2): The Bona Fide Employee
Benefit Plan Exception
The ADEA precludes an employer from "discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
lows: 1980: 11,076; 1981: 12,710; 1982: 16,102; 1983: 23,719; 1984: 21,635;
1985: 24,830; 1986: 26,549.
EEOC statistics show that age bias charges constituted about 18 percent of
all charges filed with the Commission during the fourth quarter of fiscal 1986; of
the 50,645 charges filed, 6,947 claimed age discrimination, and 2,159 were
ADEA charges filed concurrently with charges filed under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (such as race, color, sex, religion or national origin
discrimination).
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 5, at 123-24.
55. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat.
241, 253-66 (1964)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1986)).
56. As a matter of fact, some Congressmen felt that the ADEA should be an exten-
sion of Title VII. One of the cosponsors of the ADEA in the Senate attests to the fact that
he had previously advocated such an extension of the coverage of Title VII. See Senate
Hearings, supra note 31, at 29 (statement of Sen. Smathers).
57. For a comprehensive discussion of the major procedural differences between the
ADEA and Title VII, see Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90
HARV. L. REV. 380, 387-399 (1976).
58. See 113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (1967)(statement of Sen. Javits).
59. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1986) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4) (1986).
60. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583-85 (1978); Laugesen v. Anaconda
Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975)(both noting the differences in analyzing Title VII
and ADEA suits); but cf. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1015 (1st Cir. 1979);
Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 1972) (both essen-
tially saying that all discrimination suits are tried under a similar standard).
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ual's age." 61 Nevertheless, the Act also contains a special excep-
tion allowing for certain forms of age discrimination in employee
benefit plans. An employer may legitimately draw age distinctions
in providing employee benefits if it is done pursuant to a "bona
fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such
as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subter-
fuge to evade the purposes of [the Act]. '"62 Even though the ex-
ception seems contradictory to the intentions of the Act, this sec-
tion of the statute is not meant to be a retreat from the general
purposes of the ADEA. It is instead meant to emphasize the pri-
mary purpose of the Act: to promote the hiring of older workers.6"
The precise meaning of the bona fide employee benefit plan excep-
tion was clarified during the Senate debates on passage of the Act:
The meaning of this provision is as follows: An employer
will not be compelled under this section to afford to older work-
ers exactly the same pension, retirement, or insurance benefits as
he affords to younger workers. If the older worker chooses to
waive all of those provisions, then the older worker can obtain
the benefits of this act, but the older worker cannot compel an
employer through the use of this act to undertake some special
relationship, course or other condition with respect to a retire-
ment, pension, or insurance plan which is not merely a subter-
fuge to evade the purposes of the act - and we understand that
- in order to give that older employee employment on the same
terms as others. 4
This exception was intended to encourage employers to hire
older workers by preventing their hiring from becoming prohibi-
tively expensive. By its terms, the bona fide employee benefit plan
allows the employer "to offer lesser (or more expensive) medical
insurance plans to older employees, since these plans cost much
more to provide to such employees." 6 It also enables employers to
give smaller pensions to workers hired at an older age, because the
employer will have less time to set aside money for the pensions
provided to these workers.66
A benefit plan will be considered in compliance with the statute
where the actual amount of payment made, or cost incurred, in
61. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1986).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1986).
63. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 4; HousE REPORT, supra note 30, at 4.
64. 113 CONG. REC. 31,255 (1967)(statement of Sen. Javits).
65. Kass, supra note 17, at 94.
66. Id.
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behalf of an older worker is equal to that made or incurred in
behalf of a younger worker, even though the older worker may
thereby receive a lesser amount of benefits or insurance
coverage.
67
To qualify for this exception there must be some correlation
between age and the cost of the benefit. If the benefit costs the
employer more to provide to older people than to younger ones,
then the employer can give less of that benefit to older employees.
Otherwise, the older worker would be more expensive to employ
than a similarly situated younger worker. On the other hand, if
the benefit costs the same regardless of the age of the employee,
such as a fixed lump-sum payment, "then it would be rank dis-
crimination, and a subterfuge of the ADEA,"68 to give the lesser
benefit to the older worker.69 The reduction in employee benefits
must have "full economic justification" 70 to be considered a bona
fide plan under the Act.
The original drafts of the Senate bills leading up to the
ADEA did not include this exception. At least one Senator felt
that this was a serious defect since "in its absence employers
might [be] discouraged from hiring older workers because of the
increased costs involved in providing certain types of benefits to
them."'' 7 As a result, the provision was added by amendment dur-
ing the Senate proceedings,72 and was included in the final draft
that later became the Act.
One of the first, and most important, cases to interpret this
provision of the Act in relation to early retirement was United Air
Lines, Inc. v. McMann.73 The plaintiff, a former pilot, had been
forcibly retired at age sixty pursuant to an elective early retire-
ment plan that he had joined nine years earlier.74 Thereafter, Mc-
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1) (1987). Most of the cases and literature interpreting
the bona fide benefit plan exception refer to 29 C.F.R. Part 860. The language of the
pertinent sections is essentially identical in both Parts, except that Part 860 refers to the
Department of Labor and Part 1625 to the EEOC, reflecting the transfer of enforcement
responsibility for the Act from the DOL to the EEOC pursuant to the ADEA Amendments
of 1978. 52 Fed. Reg. 23, 812 (1987). "On September 28, 1981, the EEOC published final
regulations under the ADEA at 29 C.F.R. Part 1625, thereby rendering obsolete and of no
legal effect 29 C.F.R. Part 860." Id.
68. Kass, supra note 17, at 95.
69. Id.
70. 124 CONG. REc. 7886 (1978)(statement of Rep. Pepper).
71. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 14 (individual views of Sen. Javits).
72. 113 CONG. REC. 31,248 (1967).
73. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
74. Id. at 194.
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Mann brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia alleging that his forced retirement
under the plan was solely due to his age, and thereby unlawful
under the Act.75 United Air Lines responded that McMann's re-
tirement was within the provisions of a bona fide retirement plan
which he voluntarily accepted.76 At trial, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of United Air Lines.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court, holding that pre-age-sixty-five retirement plans fall
within the ADEA's definition of "subterfuge" unless the employer
can show that the "early retirement provision. . . ha [s] some eco-
nomic or business purpose other than arbitrary age discrimina-
tion."1 8 The court of appeals remanded the case to the district
court with directions to allow United Air Lines the opportunity to
show an economic or business purpose for their early retirement
plan.7 9 United then sought review in the Supreme Court.80
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Burger, reversed the appellate court, holding that United's plan
could not possibly be a subterfuge to evade the purpose of the Act
since it was established in 1941, a full twenty-six years before pas-
sage of the ADEA in 1967.81 The Court's opinion also rejected
any per se rule requiring an employer to show a valid economic or
business purpose to satisfy the subterfuge language of the Act. 2
As a direct response to the McMann decision, Congress
amended the ADEA in 1978 to specifically reject the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act. The amendment stated that:
"Plan provisions in effect prior to the date of enactment are not
exempt under [the bona fide retirement plan exception] by virtue
of the fact that they antedate the act or these amendments."8 3
Congress also wished "to make absolutely clear one of the original
purposes of this provision, namely, that the exception does not au-
thorize an employer to permit involuntary retirement of an em-
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 221 (4th Cir.
1976)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 203.
82. Id.
83. H.R. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978) [hereinafter H.R.
REPORT].
[Vol. 39:577
VOLUNTARY EARLY RETIREMENT
ployee within the protected age group on account of age. ' 84
There has been a relative paucity of decisions dealing directly
with voluntarily accepted plans. 85 The few that have been reported
have broadly held that such plans meet the requirements of the
ADEA.86 None of the pre-Paolillo decisions, however, specifically
address the meaning of the word "voluntary" under the Act. The
Second Circuit, through its decision in Paolillo, now provides
added direction toward a clearer and more precise definition of
this essential requirement in voluntary retirement plans under the
ADEA.
II. "PAOLILLO v. HENN"
Prior to 1987, no court had ever seriously questioned the
meaning of the word "voluntary" as it applied to early retirement
plans, beyond a basic examination of whether the employee had
joined the plan or was forced to retire.87 On the surface, it appears
that no deeper analysis is necessary. Admittedly, the word "volun-
84. Id.
85. The original Paolillo decision primarily relied on two cases to show that sum-
mary judgment on the issue of voluntariness was improper: Cipriano v. Board of Educ. of
City School Dist., 785 F.2d 51, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[E]ven in the case of voluntary
early retirement plans the employer. . . must come up with some evidence that the plan is
not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA by showing a legitimate business
reason for structuring the plan as it did."); EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252, 257 (2d
Cir. 1982)(summary judgment is rarely appropriate.when a party's state of mind or motive
is at issue). Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 813 F.2d 583, 585 (2d Cir.), withdrawn, 821 F.2d 81
(2d Cir. 1987). The Henn court, similar to Paolillo, makes its essential argument with only
two cases: Coburn v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983)(early retirement "is a humane practice. . . [that] sup-
ports not a hint of age discrimination"); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d
66, 71 (6th Cir. 1982)(early retirement plan at issue was an "opportunity to retire with
dignity"). Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 828 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 454 (1987).
86. See, e.g., Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 255 (1st Cir.
1986); Cipriano v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist., 785 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1986);
Patterson v. Independent School Dist. # 709, 742 F.2d 465, 467 (8th Cir. 1984); Ackerman
v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir. 1982)(ali stating that the voluntary
plans at issue were in compliance with the bona fide benefit plan exception to the ADEA).
87. Prior case law utilizes rather conclusory language on the issue of voluntariness
and early retirement without much examination into the design of the offer. See, e.g.,
Coburn v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 994 (1983) ("Early retirement is a common corporate practice utilized to prevent
individual hardship. It is a humane practice well accepted by both employers and employ-
ees, and is purely voluntary."); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 69
(6th Cir. 1982)("[T]he district judge granted the motion for summary judgment, primarily
on the ground that Ackerman had signed the agreement voluntarily ... ")(The 6th Cir-
cuit upheld the district court on this point).
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tary" is not subject to a very wide range of interpretation; a per-
son either agrees to accept early retirement or he does not. On the
other hand, "voluntariness" suggests a certain amount of rational
choice, which in turn implies that an opportunity to make a ra-
tional choice is given. As simple as this may seem, the opportunity
to make a considered choice, specifically the guarantee of a suffi-
cient amount of time in order to make one, is a contested issue
forming a split in authority between the Second Circuit's decision
in Paolillo v. Dresser Industries88 and the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion in Henn v. National Geographic Society." The primary disa-
greement concerns whether the lack of time given to employees to
make their decision raises a material issue of fact meriting a trial
to examine the design of the plan offered to them.
A. Paolillo v. Dresser Industries
As stated earlier, two Paolillo decisions were handed down
by the Second Circuit. The first decision90 was withdrawn upon
the defendant-appellee's petition for rehearing9" and a new opin-
ion was filed by the court three months later. 2 The two opinions
are essentially the same, except that the second decision only ad-
dressed the lack of time given to the employees, whereas the first
decision examined both the time issue and the appropriateness of
the test applied to burden of proof.9" Since the contested issue in
Paolillo regards the time frame given to the employees, it is im-
portant to establish the chronology of the case.
In October 1982, the Whitney Chain Division of Dresser In-
dustries, Inc., in the midst of a significant business decline, offered
an elective termination program to all of its employees aged sixty
and over.94 The reason for instituting the program was to reduce
costs. It consisted of an offer of severance pay and other benefits
to employees who agreed to retire early.95 The program was first
88. 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.), replacing 813 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1987).
89. 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 454 (1987).
90. Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 813 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), withdrawn, 821 F.2d 81 (2d
Cir. 1987).
91. Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., No. 86-7705 (2d Cir. June 16, 1987)(order withdraw-
ing the opinion of March 10, 1987 and substituting that of June 16, 1987).
92. 821 F.2d at 81.
93. Compare Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 813 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), withdrawn, 821 F.2d
81 (2d Cir. 1987) with Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1987).
94. 821 F.2d at 83.
95. Id.
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announced on Tuesday, October 12, 1982, at a meeting called on
five minutes notice, between Whitney Chain's operations manager
and those employees eligible to participate in the program. Those
attending included two of the three employees who later brought
suit, Lucy Wadsworth and Robert Grady."' The third plaintiff,
Dominic Paolillo, was not at work on the day of the meeting. He
met with the operations manager the next day and was then given
the same information provided to the other employees.9"
At the October 12 meeting, the employees were presented
with a letter stating that Whitney Chain was instituting an elec-
tive termination plan as part of an overall cost reduction program
precipitated by its recent economic problems.9" The letter stated
that participation in the program was "totally voluntary," but it
also emphasized to the employees that "you must return your
election form . . . by October 18,'"1 six days later. 100 Important
information about the program regarding the amount of medical
insurance, retiree insurance, and pension benefits was not provided
at the meeting. The letter went on to state that "meetings will be
held to answer any questions and review pension options."'' On
the afternoon of Friday, October 15, Paolillo and Grady individu-
ally met with company representatives to discuss how the plan
would affect each of them personally.10 2 Thereafter, both employ-
ees signed an election form on Monday, October 18, the last day
allowed for making a decision. 03
The sequence of events concerning Wadsworth was more
questionable. She claimed that she did not attend a meeting dur-
ing the week of October 11 to discuss the details of the program
with any company representative, and it was unclear whether she
had attended any meeting at all prior to accepting early retire-
ment.104 Wadsworth also claimed that she did not make her deci-
sion until the last day. 0 5
This sequence of events shows that from the time the employ-
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (emphasis in original).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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ees were told the full details of the program, Paolillo and Grady
had three days to decide whether to accept the plan. Acceptance
would end their respective sixteen and thirty-one years of service
with Whitney Chain. Wadsworth, by her own account, had less
than a day to make the decision to terminate her fifteen years of
employment with the company.0 6
By accepting early retirement, Paolillo received severance, pay
of $608.88 per month for two years, Wadsworth $388.75 per
month for two years, and Grady received a lump-sum payment of
$13,39 0 1 At the time, their annual salaries were $29,226,
$18,660 and $26,757 respectively. 10 8
The three former employees later brought an age discrimina-
tion suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut'0 9 against Whitney Chain claiming that they were co-
erced into accepting the early retirement plan by the method of its
implementation. Specifically, they claimed that they were given
insufficient time to make a rational choice whether to accept the
plan, thus making their decision not truly voluntary." 0 The dis-
trict court rejected these claims, concluding that the employees
had retired voluntarily as a matter of law."' As a result, the court
granted summary judgment for the employer, and the employees
appealed." 2 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the decision
of the lower court, holding that voluntariness was not established
as a matter of law, and therefore, a subsequent age discrimination
claim was not precluded."'
The original controversy between the Second and Seventh
Circuits arose when the Seventh Circuit responded to the first
Paolillo decision. Although the initial Second Circuit opinion was
replaced by the subsequent Paolillo opinion upon a rehearing of
the case, there remains disagreement between the two circuits
concerning the effect of time constraints on voluntariness. To gain
a better perspective on the evolution of the controversy, the two
decisions of the Paolillo appeals court will be addressed
individually.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 82.
110. Id. at 83.
III. Id.
112. Id. at 81.
113. Id. at 84-85.
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1. 813 F.2d 583
The Second Circuit adopted a strong and somewhat absolu-
tist position regarding age discrimination and early retirement
plans in its first resolution of Paolillo v. Dresser Industries."a4 The
court held that employees who are retired under an early retire-
ment plan targeting only older workers can establish a prima facie
case of age discrimination by simply showing that they were be-
tween forty and seventy years old"' at the time of their retire-
ment pursuant to such a plan.11 6 Once this was shown, the em-
ployer would bear the burden of proving that the employees
voluntarily chose to accept the early retirement.117 The Second
Circuit based its opinion upon a provision of the EEOC regula-
tions which governs who should carry the burden of persuasion in
suits claiming involuntary discharge under the ADEA: "Since sec-
tion 4(f)(2) is an exception from the general non-discrimination
provisions of the Act, the burden is on the one seeking to invoke
the exception to show that every element has been clearly and un-
mistakably met. The exception must be narrowly construed."" 8
The court believed that since Whitney Chain must have known
that it was giving the employees extremely little time to come to a
serious decision, the burden should be upon the employer to show
that the employees retired voluntarily and were not unduly pres-
sured by the short amount of time given to reach the decision."'
The Second Circuit's opinion was contrary to the district
court's holding that the employees voluntarily accepted the early
retirement plan as a matter of law. °20 The lower court relied upon
the fact that none of the employees had requested extra time or
expressed dissatisfaction with the short deadline, and that each
signed an acknowledgment stating the choice to retire was freely
114. 813 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), withdrawn, 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1987).
115. The upper age limit of 70 years old was eliminated by the 1986 Amendments to
the ADEA. ADEA Amendments of 1986, supra note 21, § 2(c), at 3342. In 1982, when
Whitney Chain instituted their early retirement plan, the protected age group consisted of
employees between the ages of 40 and 70. See ADEA Amendments of 1978, supra note 21,
§ 3(a), at 189.
116. 813 F.2d at 585.
117. Id.
118. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1) (1987). Paolillo cites to 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1),
which was the interpretive regulation currently in force at the time of the decision. This
regulation is now found at 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1). See supra note 67.
119. 813 F.2d at 586-87.
120. Id. at 586.
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made. l"'
Primarily, the Second Circuit believed that the district court
had applied the wrong test for establishing a prima facie case of
age discrimination under the ADEA.'22 The trial judge applied a
modified version of the requirements for a prima facie case under
Title VII, 23 as set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green."4
The lower court's application of this test required the employees
to show that they left their employment involuntarily; in effect,
that they were discharged by Whitney Chain.2 5 The court of ap-
peals considered this application of the "wrong" test to be a suffi-
ciently significant error of law to require reversal of the district
court.2 The opinion went on to address what the appellate court
considered to be a more fundamental error in the lower court's
reasoning: that the plaintiffs acted voluntarily as a matter of
law.'2 7 Since a genuine question of fact existed as to whether the
employees had acted voluntarily, or were coerced by the company
into hastily making their decision, the Second Circuit held that
granting summary judgment to the employer on the ground that
the employees had acted voluntarily as a matter of law was a re-
121. Id.
122. Id. at 585.
123. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat.
241, 253-66 (1964)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1986)).
124. 813 F.2d at 585 (applying McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)). The modified McDonnell Douglas test applied to ADEA suits requires the plain-
tiff to "prove that he (1) was discharged; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was within
the protected class at the time of the discharge; (4) was replaced by someone outside the
protected class; or (5) by someone younger, or (6) show otherwise that his discharge was
because of his age." Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987); see also Elliot
v. Group Medical & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1215 (1984).
The burden-shifting provisions of McDonnell Douglas require the plaintiff to carry the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802. Once
the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory act. Id. If the employer
can articulate such a reason, the burden is shifted back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the employer's reason was a pretext, or discriminatory in its application. Id. at 804.
The Supreme Court later clarified the McDonnell Douglas test in Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 249 (1981) by stating that the defendant need
only articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, it need not have been motivated by
it. 450 U.S. at 254.
It is perhaps more proper to refer to the resulting test as the "McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine" test; however, for the purposes of this Note, it will be referred to as simply the
McDonnell Douglas test.
125. 813 F.2d at 585.
126. Id. at 586.
127. Id.
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versible error. 28
The first Paolillo opinion may have been extreme in flatly
rejecting the McDonnell Douglas test as inapplicable to early re-
tirement ADEA suits.1 29 The Second Circuit had previously en-
dorsed adapting the McDonnell Douglas test for use in early re-
tirement plans.130 One author notes that every court of appeals,
except the Sixth Circuit, has generally applied the test without
reservation to circumstantial evidence ADEA cases,1"1 such as
Paolillo. Its acceptance is by no means uniform, however, and a
number of decisions have expressed doubts about the test's broad
applicability.1 32 In any event, because the Second Circuit found
that the plan was not voluntary as a matter of law, it was perhaps
unnecessary to criticize the use of the McDonnell Douglas test.
The existence of a material question of fact alone merited reversal
of the summary judgment. 33 This is precisely the stand that the
128. Id. at 583.
129. Apparently, the Second Circuit agrees. The substituted opinion implies by its
silence an acceptance of the district court's use of the McDonnell Douglas test, although it
still rejected the lower court's application of it. See Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 821 F.2d 81,
83-84 (2d Cir.), replacing 813 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1987).
130. See, e.g., Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1983)(citing
Burdine which is a modification of the McDonnell Douglas test); Geller v. Markham, 635
F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
131. See Eglit, supra note 53, at 169-70 & n.63 (citing cases in each of the federal
circuits that have embraced the McDonnell Douglas test wholeheartedly); see also Com-
ment, Should McDonnell Douglas Apply in ADEA Cases? The Sixth Circuit's Answer, 15
U. TOL L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1984)(noting the federal courts' general acceptance of the
McDonnell Douglas standard).
132. See, e.g., EEOC v. Borden's Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984); EEOC
v. Western Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011, 1014 (4th Cir. 1983); Ackerman v. Diamond Sham-
rock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir. 1982); McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621
F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1980); Laugeson v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir.
1975).
The Supreme Court has stated that the McDonnell Douglas test is not meant to be the
exclusive test applied to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Our decision in [McDonnell Douglas], however, did not purport to create an
inflexible formulation. We expressly noted that "Itihe facts necessarily will vary
in Title VII cases, and the specification . . . of the prima facie proof required
from [a plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing fac-
tual situations." The importance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its specifica-
tion of the discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the
general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of
offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision
was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)(citation and
footnote omitted).
133. Summary judgment is improper unless there is "no genuine issue as to any ma-
terial fact," and the moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R.
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Paolillo court adopted in its rehearing of the case.
2. 821 F.2d 81
On rehearing, the Second Circuit abandoned their criticism
of the test applied by the district court regarding burden of proof,
choosing instead to focus on how inadequate time to decide
whether to accept a plan affects the decision's voluntariness.3 4
The major significance of the decision was that an employee must
be given a reasonable amount of time to decide whether to accept
the employer's offer of early retirement if the plan is to be consid-
ered truly voluntary, and therefore consistent with the require-
ments of the ADEA.
[A]ccepting early retirement is a major decision with far-reach-
ing impact on the lives of older workers and we emphasize that
the decision must be voluntarily made. We believe that it is rele-
vant to the determination of voluntariness whether the employ-
ees received sufficient time to make a decision. Because of the
magnitude of the decision to accept early retirement, employees
must be given a reasonable amount of time to reflect and to
weigh their options in order to make a considered choice. The
amount of time will vary depending on the circumstances of
each case."15
This was the first time that a court directly addressed the
issue of time pressure and its relationship to voluntariness.3 6 Nev-
ertheless, this was not the first time that a court thought it proper
to deny summary judgment to an employer on the grounds that
the facts surrounding the design of the plan merited closer exami-
nation of the employer's intent. 3
Civ. P. 56(c). See also American Int'l Group v. London American Int'l Corp., 664 F.2d
348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981)(citation omitted)("The burden is on the moving party 'to demon-
strate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute.' "); Schwabenbauer v.
Board of Educ., 667 F.2d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Not only must there be no genuine
issue as to the evidentiary facts, but there must also be no controversy as to the inferences
to be drawn from them.").
134. Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 821 F.2d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1987).
135. Id. at 84.
136. In the first hearing of the appeal, the Court noted that there was no prior case
law specifically holding that adequate time must be given. Nevertheless, they considered
this requirement to be implicit in the concept of a voluntary decision. 813 F.2d 583, 586
(2d Cir.), withdrawn, 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir 1987).
137. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sealtest Foods, 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974):
It is possible that in the presentation of the employer's case, further evidence
relating more directly to the requisite specific intent to discriminate might be
adduced during cross-examination by Appellant. We cannot foreclose this possi-
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Even though the Paolillo court took an unprecedented stand
regarding the requisite amount of time needed to assure voluntari-
ness, there is implied support for the position adopted by the Sec-
ond Circuit. A number of studies examining retirement in general,
and pre-retirement counseling in particular, have stressed the ne-
cessity of giving employees contemplating retirement an adequate
explanation of the plan well in advance of the retirement date.'38
One study reported that ninety-three percent of the companies
that it surveyed offered their employees at least four weeks to
make a decision, with well over half of these companies offering
eight or more weeks.' 39 If these plans are structured with what are
considered reasonable deadlines, then allowing only a few days to
make a decision would appear to strain the bounds of reasonable-
ness. Surprisingly, the best case support for the reasoning in
Paolillo comes from dicta in the case that most heavily criticizes
it: "A very short period to make a complex choice may show that
the person could not digest the information necessary to the deci-
sion. This would show that the offer of information was illusory
and there was no informed choice."4"
Some commentators may argue that the Second Circuit was
too lenient in criticizing the lack of time given to employees to
accept the early retirement incentives offered by Whitney Chain.
bility. It may be that the company in this case had an impermissible intent when
discharging the Appellant which can only be judged from viewing the evidence
as a whole.
Id. at 86. A number of courts have held that summary judgment is rarely appropriate
where the moving party's state of mind is a material issue. See EEOC v. Home Ins. Co.,
672 F.2d 252, 257 (2d Cir. 1982); Schmidt v. McKay, 555 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 1977);
Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970); See also 10 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2730 (1973) (same).
138. See, e.g., D. MORSE & S. GRAY, EARLY RETIREMENT- BOON OR BANE? 8-9
(1980); Buchmann, Maximizing Post-Retirement Labor Market Opportunities, in POLICY
ISSUES IN WORK AND RETIREMENT Ill (H. Parnes ed. 1983); Wales, Ethical and Legal
Issues of Preretirement Counseling, in WORK AND RETIREMENT: POLICY ISSUES 173 (P.
Ragan ed. 1980); GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS, UNIV. OF OREGON,
EARLY RETIREMENT A SURVEY OF COMPANY POLICIES AND RETIREES' EXPERIENCES 36
(1969).
139. See supra note 5 (results of a study showing the average length of "window
periods" in surveyed employers' early retirement plans).
140. Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 828-29 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 108 S.Ct. 454 (1987) (court focused on availability of information about early retire-
ment and the ability of a person to assimilate that information rather than actual length of
time available for consideration; court found, among other things, that plaintiffs did not
argue that they lacked information nor did they argue that lack of time limited their assim-
ilation of the information.).
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One author has taken the extreme view that any early retirement
incentive limited to certain age groups is per se discriminatory.
The reasons cited for this view include:
First, early retirement incentives arguably violate the ADEA be-
cause they harm older people as a group and society as a whole.
Although they may benefit the individuals who receive them,
they foster ageist stereotypes and reduce participation of older
people in the workforce. Second, by making early retirement ar-
tificially attractive, the early retirement incentive is arguably a
wolf in sheep's clothing - it may seem like a lovely fringe bene-
fit at first, but ultimately it may harm the individuals who ac-
cept it by diminishing the length and quality of their lives.
Third, early retirement incentives are arguably a mere disguise
for mandatory retirement. No decision to accept an early retire-
ment incentive is entirely voluntary and uncoerced, because of
the power of the incentives and the contexts in which they
arise.""
The Paolillo court clearly did not adopt this broad-brushed
condemnation of age-based early retirement programs. The court
even held out the possibility that Whitney Chain could ultimately
succeed in showing that the employees had acted voluntarily.142
Their primary concern, however, was assuring that the final deter-
mination of voluntariness is made by the trier of fact when the
design of the plan is brought into question.14 3
B. Henn v. National Geographic Society and its Criticism of
the Paolillo Court
Two months after the first Paolillo decision was handed
down, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
was presented with Henn v. National Geographic Society,'
which raised similar claims that a voluntarily accepted early re-
tirement plan violated the ADEA. The court of appeals affirmed
the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the employer
concluding that early retirement plans violate the ADEA only if
the alternative is "constructive discharge" where working condi-
tions are so onerous that the employee has effectively been fired in
141. Kass, supra note 17, at 66.
142. 821 F.2d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1987).
143. Id. at 85.
144. 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 454 (1987).
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place and compelled to leave.145 Although the facts show that the
retired employees were given more time to decide than the plain-
tiffs in Paolillo,'46 they also claimed that they were pressured into
making a decision, thus rendering their choice involuntary. 141
The Henn court's opinion focused on the employees' claim of
constructive discharge; yet, the opinion also addressed the findings
of the Paolillo court, criticizing it for creating a split among the
circuits148 and for its "unusual definition of 'involuntary.' "1149
[W]hat does "voluntary" mean? We could ask, as the court did
in Paolillo, whether the employee had enough time to mull over
the offer and whether the choice was free from "pressure." (In
Paolillo the employees had less than a week, which the court
thought suspiciously short.) Yet the need to make a decision in a
short time, under pressure, is an unusual definition of "involun-
tary." . . . [N]either the brevity of the time nor the difficulty of
the choice makes the decision "involuntary." ''
The Seventh Circuit compared the short deadline to the
"take-it-or-leave-it" option given to a plea bargaining criminal de-
fendant, where the need to act in haste does not make the decision
involuntary if the defendant knows and accepts the terms of the
offer.151 In characterizing the employee's choice in this way, the
court misconstrued the relationship between employer and em-
ployee. The criminal defendant who bargains with the court for a
lesser sentence is usually admitting some measure of guilt for the
crime with which he is charged. 152 Drawing this analogy to the
employer-employee context is paramount to saying that the em-
ployee is bargaining for the opportunity to "not be fired even
though he legally could be."1153 Paolillo requires only that the em-
ployee be given a reasonable amount of time to make a considered
145. Id. at 826.
146. Id. (employees given two months as opposed to three days in Paolillo).
147. Id. at 826, 829.
148. Id. at 827.
149. Id. at 828.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. By the very act of plea bargaining, the criminal defendant is admitting his guilt
to the lesser offense regardless of whether he is in fact guilty of that offense.
153. If the employee is faced with a situation where he "properly could be fired,"
analogous to where the criminal defendant "properly could be charged with the crime com-
mitted," then he has no claim under the ADEA. Discharge for good cause is a lawful
practice, by definition, and under the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1986).
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choice.15  For the criminal defendant, a reasonable amount of
time is likely to be quite short. There is not much complexity to
the choice: "Would you rather risk the chance of spending ten
years in jail or two?" On the other hand, the decision whether to
accept early retirement carries with it many financial and personal
considerations that make the choice significantly more complex,
warranting a greater amount of time to weigh the options.
The Henn court concluded that any employee to whom the
offer of accepting early retirement is extended is the beneficiary of
a distinction based on age. Therefore, he cannot later claim to be
adversely affected by discrimination in the design of the offer. 5 '
For this reason, employees who are included in the plan would be
precluded from bringing suit under the ADEA since they are
members of the favored group. 156 The opinion also stated that em-
ployees who are excluded from such a plan would have a valid
claim of discrimination. 157 This approach suggests a superficial ex-
amination of "favoritism" in plans that only extend benefits to a
"select" group. When taken to its extreme, this view allows for
plans that are unquestionably and impermissibly discriminatory.
Certainly, no court could uphold an employer's "early retirement"
plan that offered substantial benefits to all of its black or female
employees as an incentive to leave their jobs;'58 yet such a plan
would arguably be "beneficial" to members of the "select"
group.'5  Although it may be somewhat disingenuous to extend
the Henn court's analysis this far, doing so illustrates that some
plans which offer special benefits to a select group can at the same
154. 821 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1987).
155. 819 F.2d 824, 827 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 454 (1987); cf. Trans
World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1984) ("[A] benefit that is part and parcel
of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if
the employer would be free. . . not to provide the benefit at all.") (quoting Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984)); accord Potenze v. New York Shipping Ass'n., 804
F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1955 (1987); Dorsch v. L.B. Foster
Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1427 (7th Cir. 1986).
156. 819 F.2d at 827.
157. Id.
158. See Kass, supra note 17, at 67.
159. There is, of course, a difference in the degree of judicial examination applied to
the two forms of discrimination described here. The latter, involving race and gender dis-
crimination, triggers Title VII analysis with its corollary "strict scrutiny" and "intermedi-
ate scrutiny" standards of examination into the motives behind such a plan; whereas the
former, concerning age-based distinctions, receives a lesser degree of critical analysis by
the courts. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 311, 313-14
(1976).
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time be harmfully discriminatory toward that same group by their
design.
The Seventh Circuit further claimed that the Paolillo court
had apparently "overlooked" the regulation governing early retire-
ment plans, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(f)."60 This regulation provides
that: "Neither section 4(f)(2) [the bona fide employee benefit plan
exception codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)] nor any other provi-
sion of the Act makes it unlawful for a plan to permit individuals
to elect early retirement at a specified age at their own option."16'
Even if the Second Circuit had "overlooked" this regulation re-
garding the validity of bona fide plans that use age as a criterion,
it has no real bearing on the voluntariness issue. To rely exclu-
sively on 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(f) is to look only at half of the stat-
ute. Section 623(f)(2) of the ADEA is a two-tiered statute. It be-
gins by stating that it is not unlawful to observe the terms of a
bona fide employee benefit plan"6 2 as long as the plan is not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act. 63 This is the provi-
sion of the statute addressed by 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(f). The stat-
ute contains a second requirement, however, which states that no
plan shall permit the involuntary retirement of employees pro-
tected under the statute on account of their age."" This part of
the statute is governed by 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(b)(1): "The amend-
ment [referring to the 1978 amendments to the ADEA that added
the voluntariness requirement] applies to all new and existing se-
niority systems and employee benefit plans. Accordingly, any sys-
tem or plan provision requiring or permitting involuntary retire-
ment is unlawful .. ..",15 Furthermore, if an employer wishes to
160. 819 F.2d at 827.
161. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(0 (1987).
162. The term "'bona fide employee benefit plan" has been interpreted quite broadly
as one that (I) exists, and (2) pays benefits. United Air Lines Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S.
192, 194 (1977); Potenze v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 804 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1455 (1987); Cipriano v. Board of Edue. of City School Dist., 785
F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1986); Patterson v. Independent School Dist. # 709, 742 F.2d 465,
466 (8th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252, 257 (2d Cir. 1982); see also
Note, Age Discrimination in Employment and the Benefit Plan Defense: Trends in the
Federal and Iowa Courts, 30 DRAK L. Riiv. 617, 622 n.38 (1980-81).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1986). The Supreme Court defined "subterfuge" in Mc-
Mann as "a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion." 434 U.S. at 203.
164. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1986). The early retirement plans in both the Paolillo
and Henn cases were offered to the employees on account of their age. While this in itself
is lawful under the ADEA, to permit the involuntary retirement of the employees pursuant
to a plan that makes age distinctions is not. Id.
165. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(b)(I) (1987).
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offer an early retirement program, and the plan is structured in
such a way as to call into question its voluntariness, then 29
C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1) requires the employer to show that the
element of voluntariness has been met.' 6  When Congress added
the voluntariness requirement to the ADEA in 1978, it wanted "to
make absolutely clear one of the original purposes of this provi-
sion, namely, that the exception does not authorize an employer to
require or permit involuntary retirement of an employee within
the protected age group on account of age.' 7 To decide a case
where voluntariness is at issue solely on the provisions of 29
C.F.R. § 1625.9(f) is tantamount to reading the involuntariness
clause out of the statute.
"The 'prima facie case' in the law of discrimination is a
shorthand for the constellation of events that raises a suspicion of
discrimination- enough so to require the employer to explain his
conduct."' 168 In both the Paolillo and Henn decisions, the reason
given by the employers for instituting their early retirement pro-
gram was to reduce costs through a reduction in the number of
employees.'6 9 It is clear that the means serve the ends in such a
plan; fewer employees means fewer salaries to pay and the result
is a cost savings. In Henn, the structure of the plan was consistent
with the justification for offering it. The employer wished to cut
costs by offering its employees the option of early retirement.'7"
By its terms the employees in Henn were given over two months to
consider the option.17 ' Therefore, the employer cannot be accused
of forcing the employees into making an ill-considered and invol-
untary choice. On the other hand, the employer in Paolillo would
certainly be hard-pressed to come up with a cost justification for
giving the employees less than a week to make a similar deci-
sion.17 2 The only conceivable reason for requiring such a spontane-
166. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1) (1987). See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
167. H.R. REPORT, supra note 83, at 8.
168. 819 F.2d 824, 828 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 454 (1987); see also Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
169. See 821 F.2d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1987); 819 F.2d at 826; see also CHALLENGES
AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 5, at 61 (the reasons most often given for instituting an early
retirement program are to avoid layoffs and as a response to "sluggish economic
conditions").
170. 819 F.2d at 826.
171. Id.
172. Whitney Chain had originally planned to give the employees two weeks to de-
cide, but the time was cut short due to administrative problems. 821 F.2d at 84. The dead-
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ous choice on the part of the employees would appear to be the
employer's fear of imminent financial ruin. The proffered eco-
nomic reason for structuring the plan with such a short deadline
had little, if any, real business justification .17 3 An inference re-
mains that the employees were left with a plan that impinged on
the voluntariness requirement of the ADEA. It then follows that
employees who can present evidence that the employer has ne-
glected this requirement, with no valid reason for doing so, have
made out their prima facie case.
Requiring the employer to assure that its employees are given
a reasonable amount of time to make a decision will not have the
effect of "opening up the floodgates" to a rash of unfounded
claims brought by recent early retirees who now regret the choice
that they have made. On the contrary, it will only affect those
employers who have chosen to unreasonably curtail the time given
to employees to make a considered choice. Frequently, the ration-
ality of a decision is proportional to the amount of time given to
make it. The requirement of sufficient time for consideration
merely acknowledges that there is a bottom limit to this scale. If
an employer wishes to go below this limit, it is risking the chance
that it will have to justify its reasons in court with the threat of
liability under the ADEA. All that the employer would have to do
is offer a reasonable amount of time, which is surely not an overly
burdensome requirement considering the importance of the deci-
sion to be made by the employees.
CONCLUSION
The decision to take early retirement is an important and far-
reaching one. It can be a desirable alternative to continuing in a
job that is no longer appealing or an opportunity to reap the bene-
fits of a lifetime of work at an earlier age. In either event, it is
important to ensure that the choice is voluntarily made by the re-
tiring employee, and not forced upon him. The ADEA requires
this. The Second Circuit has held that adequate time to decide is
line date was chosen so that it could assess the effect of the early retirement plan before the
end of the fiscal year. Id. While this may be a cost justification, when weighed against the
effect that it had on giving the employees a chance to come to a considered decision it is
not very compelling.
173. See Potenze v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 804 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1955 (1987)("The plan need not be the best available plan, though
obviously if it's not, the proffered reasons for the structure of the plan will have less
force.").
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an indispensable element of voluntariness, and that employers
must make sure that it is given or they risk a possible ADEA suit.
In light of the importance of the decision to be made, a reasonable
amount of time to make it is not too much to ask. The decision in
Paolillo has set a precedent for recognizing this; the tenets of
good faith dealing and fairness between employer and employee
dictate that the other circuits should follow its lead.
"Will you still need me, will you still feed me, when I'm
sixty-four?"S L A
JAMES WILLIAM SATOLA
174. J. Lennon & P. McCartney, "When I'm Sixty-Four," SERGEANT PEEPER'S
LONELY HEARTS CLUB BAND (Northern Songs Ltd. 1967).
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